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Abstract
Drawing from the case of Tibetan-Muslim relations from seventh century contact to present
Tibetan boycott campaigns against Muslims in Northeast Tibet (Amdo), this paper questions
the relevance of the mainstream theoretical disputes on ethnic conflict, i.e. primordialism,
instrumentalism, constructivism and so forth, all of which primarily seek to identify the
primary causes or origins of conflict. Most ethnic conflicts, together with other forms of
ethnic co-existence including cooperation, contain elements of all these theoretical
perspectives, which is evident in the case of Tibetan-Muslim relations presented here.
Therefore, a focus on issues of primary causes or origins is not particularly insightful, nor
does it help to explain why a particular conflictive trajectory supersedes a more cooperative
trajectory. As an alternative, this paper suggests a focus on processual factors, such as
exclusion, inclusion and the impulse for social protection, which shape or guide the evolution
of conflictive relationships, whether these be deemed of a primordial or other nature.
Accordingly, the commonalities that tie together the trends of modern ethnic conflict are not
found in the origins or primary causes of conflict, but rather, in the underlying forces of
dislocation and relocation that are fundamental to modern transformations and capitalism,
and which shape the patterns of exclusion and the possible channels for inclusion and social
protection.
Introduction
Tibet scholars rarely tread upon the subject of strife between Tibetans and Chinese Muslims
(see Glossary),2 despite a rich wealth of ethnographic knowledge to explore such issues. This
is likely due to the fact that such strife in Tibet is a taboo subject inside and outside China.3
The official line in China is that interethnic relations are harmonious. Alternative views,
particularly with respect to contemporary conflicts between Tibetans and Muslims in
Northeast Tibet (Amdo), are treated with extreme sensitivity.4 As a result, Chinese, Tibetan
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2and foreign scholars working in Tibet usually practice self-censorship with regard to the
subject. In the Tibetan exile community the subject is similarly avoided as it reveals a dark
underside of Tibetan nationalism. Instead, most references to Muslims in publications from
the exile community or from supportive western scholars tend exclusively to focus on the
small Muslim communities that settled in Lhasa and other towns of Central Tibet prior to the
Chinese take-over in 1950.5 These are euphemistically referred to as ‘Tibetan Muslims’ and
their relations with local Tibetans were indeed harmonious.
However, these views completely ignore the military confrontations that took place between
Tibetans and certain Chinese Muslim warlords in Amdo as recently as the 1930s and 1940s.
They also sidestep the fact that during the reforms of the last two decades, Tibetan aggression
has come to be increasingly directed against the Muslim minority in Tibet, despite the fact
that Han Chinese present by far the strongest exclusionary force in the local economy. In
addition, despite popular perceptions of Tibetans as pacifists, the racist and violent backlash
against the Nepali Bhutanese minority in Bhutan in the late 1980s and 1990s serves as a
poignant reminder of the potential for violent ethnic conflict that lies within even these
idealised Himalayan Tibetan Buddhist cultures, particularly towards other vulnerable and
stigmatised ethnic minorities.6
In addition to making an initial exploration of such rarely charted issues, this paper also sheds
light on theories of ethnic conflict, such as primordialism, instrumentalism, constructivism,
political economy, or narrowly-defined forms of institutionalism. It argues that these theories
are largely inadequate to explain or predict the evolution of ethnic conflict, insofar as they
focus on the origins or primary causes of conflict, i.e. strong/weak states versus weak/strong
societies, ethno-linguistic or religious fragmentation, enclave economies, and so forth. These
sorts of theoretical pursuits inevitably lead into a circular chicken-and-egg quandary, given
the fact that ethnic conflicts are invariably the outcome of historical continuities that possess
both inheritance and creativity. As a result, various theoretical stances regarding origins or
primary causes can be read into any particular case depending on how the case is examined.
For example, current Tibetan-Muslim conflict can be easily interpreted as either
primordialist, on the basis of deeply entrenched patterns of Tibetan-Muslim encounters since
their first contacts in the seventh century, and they can be as easily interpreted as
constructivist or instrumentalist on the basis of political economy and power confrontations
that have been inherent to the profound dislocations of the modern period.
As an alternative, a focus on processual factors is suggested, i.e. factors that mould or guide
conflictive encounters between groups over time, whether the conflicts themselves be deemed
of a primordial or other nature. In particular, this paper combines two social science
approaches: the analytical framework of social exclusion, as explored for application to
developing countries by the International Labour Office in the 1990s; and the Polanyian
concept of double movement. In the first case, the term ‘exclusion’ is used as a concept to
analyse exclusionary processes within development and change.7 The Polanyian concept of
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3double movement refers to the impulse for social protection among individuals or groups in
response to the profoundly dislocating effects of modern transformations.8
By combining these two approaches, ethnic conflict can be analysed as one possible outcome
of the impulse for social protection, conditioned by the exclusionary propensities within
social change. Accordingly, the commonalities that tie together the patterns of modern ethnic
conflict are not found in the origins or primary causes of conflict, but rather in the underlying
forces of dislocation and relocation that are fundamental to modern transformations and
capitalism, and which shape the patterns of exclusion and the possible channels for inclusion
and social protection. The advantage of this perspective is that it emphasises the processual
factors such as economic polarisation or social exclusion that create the conditions for the
conflictive dimensions inherent in any relationship or social order to degenerate or become
exacerbated.
This processual approach will be here applied to the example of Tibet, discussed from a
Tibetan perspective and with a focus on Amdo (Northeast Tibet), where the interface with
Chinese Muslims is the most dense and contested. The analysis is divided into two sections.
The first sketches a broad historical overview of Tibetan relations with Muslims since initial
contact in the seventh century. The second section deals with the current rise of anti-Muslim
sentiment throughout the Tibetan areas, culminating in a regional boycott of Muslim
businesses in 2003 following the outbreak of Tibetan-Muslim violence in Amdo. This section
draws mostly from recent fieldwork in Tibet from 2003 to 2005 and in Tibetan refugee
communities in India from 1995 to 2001. The theoretical ramifications of the study are
explored further in the conclusion.
Figure 1: Representation of Tibetan Cultural Areas
Source: Fischer (2005), based on maps in the Tibetan and Himalayan Digital Library (University of Virginia)
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4Tracing the roots of Tibetan-Muslim relations in Tibet
Despite its stereotyped isolation, Tibet has been intricately interwoven into international
power dynamics since the formation of the Tibetan empire in the seventh century. More
recently, the pattern of fragmented integration into larger spheres of power that has
dominated most of the second millennium of Tibetan history, and which, to a large extent,
pre-empted the revival of centralised rule following the breakdown of the empire, is itself
related to what Janet Abu-Lughod refers to as the first wave of globalisation, predicated on
the expansion of the Mongolian empire in the thirteenth century.9 Thus the very inception of
Tibetans, conceived as a collectivity inhabiting the Tibetan plateau, speaking Tibetan and, for
the most part, practicing a form of Buddhism imported from India and adapted into what is
now known as Tibetan Buddhism, runs parallel to the integration of Tibet into the world
system.
Throughout the centuries, Tibetan relations with Muslims have been fluid, changing and
contested, and by no means were they in some stable or fixed pattern, characterised as either
harmony or animosity. Nonetheless, up until the late nineteenth century, these relations
evolved along a fairly consistent conception and structuring of hierarchy and local power
relations within the Tibetan areas, where Tibetans ruled the turf and controlled land-based
wealth, while Muslims generally played subordinate economic roles, mainly specialising in
trade, commerce and certain services. This started to erode around the end of the nineteenth
century, first in northeast Tibet (Amdo) and in symbiosis with the breakdown of imperial
China and the emergence of the modern Chinese nation. Following the victory of the
Communists in China, and in particular during the radicalisation of Maoism from the mid-
1950s to the mid-1970s, the erosion of these local hierarchies and power relations was, for a
time, overshadowed.
In order to understand the evolving co-existence between Tibetans and Muslims in the more
liberalised context of the reform period from the late 1970s onwards, it is necessary to reach
deep into Tibetan history in order to understand both the deeply rooted continuity of these
historical conceptions of hierarchy and power as well as the conditions that are utterly new,
entirely breaking with the past. The historical perspective also helps to decipher Tibetan
rhetoric, given that Tibetans themselves draw upon their own historiographic tradition to
create discourses and ideologies from which to understand, interpret and act upon their
current circumstances. In this manner, notions of primordialism or cultural essentialism can
be equally understood as reflections of constructed and instrumented identity over time, albeit
these acts of construction are not exclusive to the modern period.
Central Tibet
Contact with other cultures in the early Tibetan empire from the seventh century onwards, if
not before, played an integral role in the formation of a Tibetan ethno-national psyche.
Indeed, the economic resurgence of Central Asia in the sixth and seventh centuries following
the Turkic conquest of western Central Asia in part stimulated the northward expansion of the
Tibetan empire from its base in Central Tibet and towards the Silk Road.10 By the same
token, the subjugation of the Tibetan plateau under the tsanpo (Tibetan emperors) in the
seventh to eighth centuries arguably played a foundational role in the construction of a
Tibetan identity from among a diverse selection of kingdoms, tribes and other groupings
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5scattered across the plateau, in distinction from groups outside the plateau. By the eighth
century the Tibetan empire was expanding outside the plateau and into Central Asia and the
Gansu Corridor, with the objective of controlling key points along the Silk Road, and even
penetrated into the heart of the Chinese Tang Empire, conquering the capital of Chang’an in
763.11
Conversion to Buddhism, so central to Tibetan identity in later centuries, played a key role in
the early construction of collective identity, alongside its role as a tool of state-craft and
ideology.12 However, contact with Arabs and Islam was also clearly evident in this earlier
period. Indeed, Arab encroachments in Central Asia in the seventh and eighth centuries most
likely acted as an important catalyst for the consolidation of the Tibetan empire, including the
conversion to Buddhism as an ideological system to compete with Islam and in deference to
other influential regions of Buddhist Asia. It may even be the case that competition with
Islam stimulated certain canonical developments within Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, such as the
famous Kalachakra Tantra commentaries, which contain a definite and strong anti-Muslim
undertone.13
Nonetheless, early contact with Arabs or Muslims was not always adversarial. Commercially,
Arabs played increasingly significant roles along the Silk Road along with other Central and
West Asians.14 There might have also been some Arab/Islamic presence in Lhasa at this time
related to such commerce.15 Even in martial terms, military contact with Arab and Central
Asian armies often involved strategic alliances against the Chinese, with Tibetans playing a
pivotal role in regional diplomacy and warfare.16 Collusion with both sides demonstrates that
the Tibetan empire was operating within its own strategic framework as a competing empire,
at least within its short heyday of rapid territorial expansion, which was quickly eroded on
both fronts from the ninth century onwards.17
The rapid boom and bust of the empire undoubtedly led to the dissemination of many foreign
cultural influences into Tibet, including Islam, with a 10th century Arabic text mentioning the
presence of a mosque in Lhasa.18 Indeed, during the period of political anarchy following the
demise of the Tibetan empire in the ninth and tenth centuries, a great variety of religious
practices were in vogue in Tibet, including influences from China such as Chan Buddhism.19
This led to sectarian strife in Tibet and it also probably intensified the competitive posturing
of Buddhist elites against the ongoing expansion of Islam in Asia.
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6Another phase of exposure to Muslims in Central Tibet took place alongside the rapid
expansion of the Mongolian empire in the thirteenth century, during which the Mongol court
converted to Tibetan Buddhism and Tibet eventually came under control of the Kubilai/Yuan
dynasty in China and the Sakya order in Tibet following their power rivalry with the Stod
Hor Mongols and Drigung Tibetans that lasted several decades.20 Given that the rule of the
Mongol factions that were competing in Central Tibet stretched as far as Persia, considerable
cultural influence was transmitted from Central Asia as well as from Mongol-ruled China.21
The westward Mongol conquests also initiated eastern migrations of Muslims from Central
Asia, thereby entrenching a Muslim presence across Northwest China, particularly in the
Gansu region bordering Amdo. Muslims were also closely involved in the Yuan court and
they acted as soldiers, merchants and officials who travelled with the Mongol armies in
Northwest China.22 Given these roles, it is probable that Mongol military activity in Central
Tibet brought with it a Muslim presence and helped to establish the patterns of Muslim trade
throughout the Tibetan areas that still persist with strength today.
In addition to direct contact with Muslims via the Mongols, the ascendancy of Sufism across
the Muslim world from the eleventh century onwards also probably had an important indirect
influence on the development of Tibetan political and religious ideology. Tibetan elites
would have been aware of these developments due to their incorporation into the Mongol
empire, as well as the regular traffic of Tibetan scholars to Northern India, where many Sufi
refugees had also fled to escape the turmoil wrought by the Mongols in Central Asia.23
The similarities between many of the politico-religious evolutions in both Sufism and Tibetan
Buddhism during this period are striking. A case in point is the emergence of the trulku
institution (lineages of recognised incarnations of lamas). This occurred parallel to similar
developments of the shaikh institution under Sufism, which from its own side was generating
a revolution of social and political organisation in Muslim communities throughout the
Muslim world.24 While the trulku institution obviously drew inspiration from the earlier
Tibetan tradition of ‘sacral kingship’,25 the contemporaneity between these two
developments, as decentralised forms of political, economic and social organisation, suggests
cross-fertilisation between Islamic and Buddhist systems, including doctrinal as well as
institutional innovations.
Following the demise of the Yuan dynasty, Central Tibet fell back into renewed civil wars.
An invasion by the Khoshot Mongols in 1640 temporarily ended the strife by conquering
most of Tibet and establishing the Fifth Dalai Lama as ruler under their protection and
patronage.26 Several scholars trace the emergence of a nascent form of religious proto-
nationalism back to this time, if not before.27 With regard to Muslims, the ‘Great Fifth’
apparently attempted to counterbalance the Buddhist bias within this religious nationalism by
practicing a policy of religious tolerance towards non-Buddhists and he even held a proactive
stance towards Muslims as part of a larger policy of encouraging ethnic, cultural and
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7economic diversity in Tibet.28 The presence of Muslim merchants in the main towns and
cities of Tibet was undoubtedly deemed vital for interregional trade, especially given that
Central Tibet was dependent on imported food and commodities, and the poorer members of
the Muslim community also conveniently performed the stigmatised jobs of butchery and
vegetable farming.29
Nonetheless, up to the twentieth century the small Muslim presence in Central Tibet
remained limited. Small groups of traders and workers came from Sichuan or Northwest
China and were known in Tibetan as the Hopaling, while wealthier Muslim merchants came
from Kashmir, Ladakh and Nepal. Both groups mostly settled in Lhasa, Shigatse and several
other main towns.30 By 1959, when the fourteenth Dalai Lama escaped into exile, their
combined population in Lhasa, the largest population centre, was estimated at around two
thousand.31 These ‘Tibetan Muslims’ intermarried with Tibetans and assimilated into the
dominant culture, including the adoption of Tibetan language.32 While these intimate cross-
cultural exchanges were restricted to the main urban centres, Tibetans from all Tibetan
regions typically made pilgrimages to the centres. Therefore, even Tibetans from remote rural
areas would have had at least heard of the Muslims in these more cosmopolitan and
interethnic towns.
Amdo
While Amdo, like Kham (eastern Tibet), was incorporated into the Tibetan empire in the
seventh and eighth centuries, the demise of the empire left these regions largely under the
control of a heterogeneous mix of petty kingdoms, tribes, powerful monasteries and other
localised organisations of power. By the thirteenth century Amdo was well incorporated into
the Mongolian empire and various Mongol tribes continued to hold much authority over this
area even following the demise of the Yuan dynasty in China.33 By the eighteenth century,
Amdo had been nominally absorbed into the Qing Empire, although in many cases direct rule
was applied with much difficulty if at all. Notably, despite Qing dominance, Central Tibet
continued to wield considerable influence across Amdo and Kham up to the twentieth century
through monastic and trulku networks. Monastic and trulku estates in turn acted as important
centres of political and economic influence, were involved in trade, commerce and finance,
and were the organisational centres for militias and local armies.34
Due to the borderland location of the main population centres of Amdo alongside the historic
Gansu province,35 which in turn is one of the main centres of Chinese Muslims, Amdo has
served as the nerve centre for Tibetan-Muslim relations throughout the centuries, particularly
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8considering the strategic position of Gansu as a crossroad of the Silk Road between the
Turkic west, the Mongolian north, the Tibetan south and the Chinese east. To illustrate this
proximity, the Muslim centre of Hezhou, today called Linxia in modern Gansu Province and
known euphemistically as ‘the Chinese Mecca’, is very close to the extensive Labrang
monastic complex (Ch. Xiahe), which up to the 1950s was one of the largest Tibetan
monasteries of Tibet outside Lhasa.36 Hezhou in particular has served as one of the main
sources of Muslim trade in the Tibetan areas, even as far south as Lhasa or southern Kham.37
Further south in Gansu, the Muslim community in Taozhou (today known as Lintan) was a
close neighbour to the influential Tibetan monastery of Chone. Nearby in Qinghai, the Salar
Muslims are said to have settled and intermarried with local Tibetans as early as the
thirteenth century in what is now the Xunhua Salar Autonomous County in the present-day
Haidong District of Qinghai.38 This county is entirely surrounded by traditionally Tibetan
areas and also includes four Tibetan townships. It borders Rebgong, the county that seats the
Rongwo (Ch. Longwu) Monastery and Town, another major power and religious centre of
Amdo. Kumbum Monastery (Ch. Ta’ersi), the other major monastery of this core area of
Amdo founded in the sixteenth century by the Third Dalai Lama, is very close to Xining City.
Although Xining has been a Chinese garrison city since the twelfth century and possibly
before, there have also been large Muslim populations on its outskirts for almost as long.39
Thus ironically, although Amdo Tibetans clearly see the Muslims as outsiders in Amdo, most
of the Muslims within Amdo are indigenous to very proximate if not overlapping regions of
northwest China, and many hail from Muslim families that have been residing in Tibetan
towns for over a century, if not several.
The Tibetan-Muslim interface has therefore been much denser and more contested than in
Central Tibet, although despite contestation, cooperative synergies were equally dense. For
instance, with even more force that in Central Tibet, intermarriage was relatively common
between Tibetans and the local Turkic-speaking, Chinese-speaking, Tibetan-speaking or
Mongolic-speaking ‘Chinese’ Muslims,40 as well as with Mongolians and Monguors, who
were mostly Tibetan-Buddhist, and with local Han Chinese, many of whom were also
Buddhist.41 Similarly, Muslims in Amdo filled specialised economic roles that continue to the
present. Typically, they were based in market towns and moved between pastoral and
agricultural zones as traders, merchants, middlemen, brokers and translators.42 They
controlled much of the trade in livestock products, particularly wool and hides, and also
worked as butchers for Tibetans. In many cases Muslims were invited by Tibetan rulers to fill
these specialised roles and their settlements and trade routes influenced the development of
many Amdo Tibetan towns.43
It is important to recall that land and its produce were the dominant source of wealth in China
up until the twentieth century. Therefore, Tibetans, and in particular Tibetan nomads, with
their abundant land in comparison to neighbouring Muslim or Chinese areas, were relatively
wealthy. Local accounts collected during fieldwork confirm this perspective, in that it was
repeatedly asserted that Muslims in this region were generally considered to be poorer than
Tibetans up until the beginning of the reform period. It has only been since the 1980s that
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9Muslims have come to achieve a perceived economic superiority over Tibetan farmers and
herders.44 In this sense, the trading and service roles of the Muslims would not have
necessarily been perceived as a threat by Tibetans in the past, as the Muslims were
performing work that was generally stigmatised by Tibetans.
The Tibetan-Muslim symbiosis in Amdo nonetheless came to be underlain by competition
and violent confrontations in recent centuries. Increasing tension was probably stimulated by
the rise of Muslim militancy in the northwest during the demise of the Ming dynasty in the
seventeenth century,45 which coincided with the spread of Sufism into Gansu. In particular,
Xining, Xunhua and Hezhou became key organisational hubs for the Sufi movement through
the missionary and political activism of several charismatic sheikhs from Central Asia.46
Conversion of non-Muslims was particularly emphasised, with some success among
Tibetans, Mongols, Turks and Chinese.47 Rising Muslim influence under Sufism therefore
gradually came to contest local Tibetan/Buddhist dominance in these regions.48
As previously suggested with regard to Central Tibet, Muslim activism probably also
catalysed similar activism among Tibetan/Buddhist elites. This is reflected by the founding of
Labrang Monastery at the beginning of the eighteenth century and its subsequent
development into a local power centre within a nexus of Tibetan, Mongolian and Qing
patronage.49 Up to the Muslim uprisings in the second half of the nineteenth century, local
Tibetan rulers managed to hold the upper hand of Manchu favour under the imperial policy of
using minorities to rule minorities in the borderlands. Tibetan armies or militias often assisted
the Qing military in various pacification campaigns against Muslim rebellions in
neighbouring Muslim strongholds, such as Xunhua or Xining.50
However, this particular configuration of ethnic alliance was not cut and dry. Both Chinese
and Tibetans had joined earlier Muslim uprisings in the Northwest during the demise of the
Ming dynasty and loyal Muslim forces were also often used in Qing pacification campaigns
to put down rebellious Muslims.51 Alliances were also notably local, such as in Chone and
Taozhou, where local Tibetans often offered protection or refuge to their Muslim neighbours
against attacks by non-local Muslims.52 Nonetheless, for most of the Qing dynasty,
pacification singled out Muslims, who were portrayed as naturally violent and rebellious,
while patronising preference was given to Tibetan elites.53
This patronage-instilled ethnic power balance slowly reversed towards the end of the Qing
dynasty. Several of the loyalist Muslim warlord families in the northwest managed to gain
considerable Qing imperial favour (and military co-dependence) due to their role in pacifying
the Muslim rebellions and supporting central rule in Gansu in the late nineteenth century.
Following the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911, they successfully navigated both favour
and local authority over to Nationalist allegiance.54 The rise to power of the Ma Muslim
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warlord family based in the northeast corner of Qinghai (Ma Qi followed by his nephew Ma
Bufang) in the first part of the twentieth century was particularly relevant for Amdo Tibetans.
Ma Qi was appointed by the Republican government as governor of the newly created
province of Qinghai in 1928 and Ma Bufang took over leadership following the death of his
uncle in 1931. They “established essentially a separate, and Islamic, state-within-a-state in
Qinghai under the Republic”, relying heavily on the Hui and Salar in the administration and
military while excluding Tibetans, Monguors and Mongols.55 For the first time in the history
of Amdo, local Tibetans were surpassed by local Muslims in strategic alliance and military
strength.
The creation of Qinghai nominally incorporated large parts of the vast Tibetan territories of
Amdo and Kham (Yushu), which had hitherto never been incorporated into the historic
Gansu province per se, beyond the granting of symbolic imperial titles by the Manchu.56 Ma
Bufang attempted to forcefully incorporate these territories through punitive military
campaigns as far south as Golok, which in turn were faced with much resistance. Counter-
resistance tended to be very violent, often involving the destruction of monasteries and the
sacking of towns.57 Most of Qinghai eventually submitted, although it seems that about half
of Golok was never subdued. Ma Bufang was also involved in military campaigns as far
south as northern Sichuan in the 1930s, fighting alongside Nationalist and Sichuan warlord
forces against Lhasa.58
The success of Ma brought a reconfiguration of territory, population and even ethnicity in
and around the northeast corner of Qinghai (Huangzhong). In Huangzhong itself, many
Tibetans were forcibly converted to Islam and assimilated into Muslim communities, or else
they were forced off the more centrally located lands and into higher altitude hinterlands of
the region, or outside of the region altogether.59 This was particularly the case in Hualong,
Xunhua and Minhe Counties of the present-day Haidong District, where Ma Bufang sourced
his Muslim power base in the midst of sizeable surrounding Tibetan populations.60 There
were also many military confrontations along the southern borders of these counties with
neighbouring local Tibetan rulers in Chentsa and Rebgong given that Ma was attempting to
extend the same policies of ethnic cleansing further south across the Yellow River. Current
ethnic distributions, with Muslims on the north bank of the Yellow River in Hualong and
Tibetans on the south bank in Chentsa, were in part wrought by these confrontations.61
The aggressive policies of cleansing and assimilation by Ma Bufang also created an exodus
of Tibetans and Muslims from these core counties of Huangzhong. Many of these refugees
were permitted by Ma to relocate to the west, in the region that is today known as the Tsolho
(Ch. Hainan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. The refugees were mostly farmers and they
established themselves in areas that had hitherto been purely nomadic, thereby reshaping land
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use and creating conflict between nomads and the new farmers in these areas.62 Muslims also
followed into Tsolho and other Tibetan areas during this time, some of them also escaping the
autarkic rule of Ma, and they account for many of the Muslim households that are rural and
agrarian in these areas. Similar cross-cutting of ethnic solidarity can be noted elsewhere, such
as during the Muslim warlord attacks on the Xidaotang Muslim compounds in Taozhou in the
late 1920s, which were resisted by local Tibetans and Muslims alike and led to the exile of
the Xidaotang into Tibetan territory.63
Outside of their patronage of Ma rule, the Nationalist government in China had little direct
effect on these local power struggles in Amdo given that their energies were monopolised by
Japanese invasion and civil war from the 1930s onwards. Communist victory in 1949 was
therefore the first time that modern China had the capacity to enforce any direct central rule
on these areas. Ironically, the subsequent administrative and economic reorganisation of the
rural areas by the Communists had the effect of fixing the de facto configurations of these
ethnic power struggles as they had evolved up to the 1950s, including individual
administrative ethnic status. Part of Tibetan discontent during this early Communist period,
besides the upheaval and bloodshed, derived from this fact that the fixing of territory and
identity took place at a time when Tibetans were in a subordinate position to the Muslim
warlords, having lost significant amounts of territory and people in several key locations.
The early Communist leadership apparently misinterpreted the complex dynamics of
interethnic relations in Amdo. For instance, it seems that they had miscalculated that the
Amdo Tibetans would support them because they had defeated Ma Bufang in 1949, but they
were themselves faced by resistance from both Tibetans and Muslims from the mid-1950s
onwards. In both cases resistance was not necessarily directed towards Chinese rule per se,
which had come and gone many times over the centuries and in many cases was received
with varying degrees of local support.64 Rather, the main points of contention were the radical
socialist fast forward into collectivisation and the dismantling of the influence of religious
institutions, both of which started in earnest in the mid-1950s and reneged on earlier promises
made by the CCP.65 As a result, armed resistance became very stiff in Amdo only from the
mid-1950s onwards and in some cases joined forces with resistance movements in Kham.
The peak of Amdo Tibetan resistance occurred in 1958, when several Tibetan regions of
Qinghai broke out into full scale guerrilla warfare, occurring side by side with an uprising
organised by a Salar Muslim in Xunhua.66 Both were met by a heavy counterinsurgency
campaign mounted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), although guerrilla activity
continued in some remote Tibetan areas well into the 1960s.67
However, with the advent of the reform period in the late 1970s, tensions between Amdo
Tibetans and local Muslims have gradually remerged as one of the dominant foci of
contestation within the transforming society and economy. Conflicts with Muslims, including
occasional flares of violence, have been notably social, dealing with day-to-day interactions,
often over issues trade and commerce. Tibetans claim that Muslim traders cheat, charge
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unfair prices, give fake money, and so forth.68 Muslims living within or beside Tibetan areas
are often accused of crime.69 Local conflicts have also flared up with respect to the ‘purchase’
(most likely long-term lease) of land for building mosques or cemeteries near Tibetan
towns.70 Most recently, these various local conflicts have coalesced with sufficient
momentum to produce a regional boycott movement by Tibetans against Muslim businesses
in Tibetan areas.
Boycotts and Modern Myth Creation in Amdo
The idea of boycotting Muslim businesses appears to have developed in different pockets of
Amdo in the 1990s. However, the roots of the idea might possibly be traced further back into
the exile community in India, inspired by Gandhian concepts of Swadeshi (self-sufficiency)
and Swaraj (self-rule) as possible strategies to take against the increasingly marketized
Chinese rule during the reform period.71 It only escalated into a regional movement following
a clash between Tibetans and Muslims in Chentsa (Ch. Jianza) County in January 2003.72
This event, which occurred parallel to several other Tibetan-Muslim clashes in other parts of
Amdo, appears to have acted as a catalyst and rallying cry for the boycott to be taken up as a
regionally coordinated political movement, spreading as far south as Lhasa and Kham. As a
result, Amdo has come to act as an epicentre for Tibetan-Muslim confrontation, influencing
Tibetan attitudes towards Muslims across all of Tibet. This section focuses on the emergence
of the boycott movement along with the associated racist mythologies that were instigated by
Tibetan elites in order to mobilise a largely rural and undereducated Tibetan population.
Economic foundations for Tibetan discontent towards Muslims
Muslim businesses have essentially come to be targeted by Tibetans due to the perception
among Tibetans that Muslims have been increasingly dominating the liberalising economies
of the Tibetan areas. This perception is particularly strong in Amdo, but it also extends as far
south as Lhasa in Central Tibet. In particular, the main concern relates to Muslim dominance
in the tertiary businesses of trade, transport and catering, with Muslim restaurants
representing a symbolic rallying point.
The notion of Muslim economic dominance requires qualification. Obviously, the Chinese
state remains by far the most dominant player in the Tibetan economy, a role that has been
intensifying since the mid-1990s under various western development strategies (WDS).73
However, rising Tibetan-Muslim tensions relate to two issues that are residual to this rapid
state-led growth. One has been the marked economic advantage accrued during the reform
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period in the activities that have traditionally been the specialisation of Muslims versus those
of Tibetans, i.e. trade, commerce and services versus farming and herding. The second has
been the entry of Muslims into the new, albeit limited economic opportunities that have come
about in the wake of state-induced growth and that are largely concentrated in the rapidly
growing Tibetan towns. The fact that Muslim are perceived as advantaged in the newly
emerging urban economies compounds the disadvantages felt by Tibetans in these same
areas, particularly within the context of intensified migration since the mid-1990s.74
The first issue is poignantly summarised by the story of wool. From the late 1980s to 2004,
the terms of trade of raw wool, relative to general consumer prices, have dropped by more
than three quarters.75 The cause of this dramatic collapse in wool prices lies in the gradual
economic reforms of the 1980s in China, whereby the practice inherited from Maoist
economic planning of under pricing raw materials (such as wool) was continued while fiscal
regional redistribution was reduced.76 This in turn catalysed the ‘wool wars’ of the mid- to
late-1980s in the major wool producing provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Inner Mongolia and
Xinjiang, along with other ‘commodity wars’ elsewhere in the interior of China. Local
governments in the wool- producing regions were trying to protect the development of local
wool-processing industries as a means of using the undervalued wool to promote local
production and wealth. Meanwhile, coastal processing industries were trying to maintain a
secure supply of wool and the national government was trying to regulate the rapid
proliferation of production as well as a stable inter-regional supply of wool. It was precisely
these conditions of intense competition, within a chaotic structure of fixed, negotiated and
market prices, that led the national government to make wool into one of the first raw
commodities to become fully deregulated and, more importantly, liberalised to international
trade as a means to circumvent local protectionism and to guarantee supply to the coastal
industries. The inflow of higher quality and relatively cheap (and heavily subsidised) wool
from the late 1980s onwards, primarily from Australia and New Zealand, has been one of the
main factors underlying the collapse of wool prices in the 1990s.77
The impact of collapsing wool prices has been enormous for Tibetans, rendering the
monetary value of their main surplus tradable commodity almost worthless. On the other
hand, Muslims in Tibetan areas have not been adversely affected by such dramatically falling
terms of trade given that they have traditionally specialised in the trade of wool products.
Although wool had been undervalued during the Maoist period (although less severely than
in the 1990s), strict control over the economy via collectivisation prevented such pricing
issues from degenerating into local distributional conflicts. In particular, total state monopoly
over local trade in commodities removed Muslims from their traditional niche role as
regional traders across the Tibetan areas, thus removing them as objects of interethnic
communal tension. However, Muslims reverted to this traditional role with the freeing of
migration, markets and individual entrepreneurship from the beginning of the reform period
onwards. In some cases, they have almost completely taken over the trading role of the state
by buying up county-owned trading companies during waves of privatisation in the 1990s.78
In other words, the liberalisation of the wool trade occurred alongside an increasing presence
of Muslims in the Tibetan areas, some of whom were regular residents in these areas, but
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many of whom were not necessarily settled within any particular Tibetan community,
although generally native to the larger Qinghai-Gansu region.79 Therefore, by the time wool
prices started to collapse in the 1990s in the midst of a range of other liberalisations, the face
mediating the collapse was the private Muslim trader, not the local Chinese or Tibetan
officials, whose wool trading and processing operations were largely perceived to be defunct.
Whether or not Muslims engaged in unfair trading practices, Tibetan discontent was
undoubtedly felt and expressed through their trading interactions with Muslims. For this
reason, many of the accounts of fighting between Tibetans and Muslims over the last ten
years that I collected during field work, particularly in nomadic areas, pertained to the wool
trade, and in particular, wool prices.
This brings us to the second issue of Tibetan discontent with Muslims; the entry of Muslim
migrants into new areas of economic activity in Tibetan towns. Again, this partly relates to
the story of wool. Within the context of the wool wars in the 1980s, wool processing
proliferated in many Tibetan counties of Qinghai, as well as in the other wool-producing
provinces. Tibetans were involved in these efforts, either at the level of workers or
management. However, the collapse of wool prices in the 1990s, along with national
government carrot and stick strategies aimed at controlling the proliferation of wool
processing, led to a consolidation of the industry in the western wool-producing provinces.
One of the disciplinary strategies involved the removal of subsidies for county-owned
factories, in line with the national policy to streamline the state-owned industrial sector by
shedding less profitable enterprises, particularly those in non-strategic sectors such as
textiles. Unfortunately, most of the Tibetan efforts to enter wool processing had been led by
county-run ventures, typically (and often poorly) run by local Tibetan (and Chinese and
Muslim) managers selected by (and often related to) county officials.80 The removal of
subsidies therefore caused the closure or privatisation of most of these local government-run
operations by the late 1990s or early 2000s. During my fieldwork in 2004, I was not able to
identify a single Tibetan wool-processing factory in Qinghai that was still viable.81
This does not imply, however, that the wool-processing industry in Qinghai is
underdeveloped. On the contrary, by the late 1990s it had consolidated into a small number of
large private players, with the largest acting as a monopsonistic buyer of higher quality wool.
As it happens, these players were mostly Muslim. Indeed, the market for higher quality wool
has come to be dominated by a sophisticated wool-processing enterprise based in Xunhua
County, known as the Qinghai Snowboat Three Wool Group. This private group was formed
in the 1980s on the purchase of privatised government factories in Xunhua by four Salar
Muslims, one of whom, although illiterate, is apparently the richest man in Qinghai today. It
has since been tightly managed by these four owners, together with considerable logistical
support from the local Xunhua County government. The operations of the main factory in
Xunhua, which employs 1100 people, are based entirely on the processing of Tibetan yak,
sheep and camel wool. Notably, this company came to dominate the industry in Qinghai after
they scaled up their operations by importing high-tech processing machinery from Japan and
Germany.82 Smaller, less sophisticated private Muslim processing businesses have also
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remained active in the region, capturing the supply of lower quality wool. As a result, the
only processing operations that seem to have survived this period of industrial restructuring
have been the private Muslim ones and most of the trade in Tibetan wool in Qinghai is
currently dominated by these players.
It is interesting to note that the industrial processing of wool has not necessarily been a
traditional niche of these local Muslims. For instance, the Salar in Xunhua had not been
involved in industry prior to the 1980s, concentrating instead on agriculture and trade.83
Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, the ladder for Amdo Tibetans to progress into higher value-
added processing and marketing of their main commodity had been effectively kicked away.
The resultant de-industrialisation of the main Tibetan towns in Amdo has left Amdo Tibetans
with slim options for non-farm employment, which they have sorely needed precisely due to
the sharp decline in prices for wool and their other commodities, such as barley or wheat.
This has intensified competition in the remaining new areas of economic activity, again
mostly concentrated in the towns. Public employment is a coveted option, such as work in the
government or as teachers, although this tends to be restricted to the educated few (of which
Tibetans are very few). It is also very competitive and opportunities are possibly shrinking
despite the rapid expansion of the public sector as an economic category.84 The much higher
education standards of Chinese migrants as well as their cultural advantages within regional
political and economic circles result in the fact that elite Tibetans are increasingly pressured
from this side of higher skilled employment, particularly considering government efforts to
streamline public employment. However, given the extremely low education standards of
most Tibetans, these positions are not the object of their employment covets.
Rather, the only areas of employment in which most Tibetans could conceivably compete are
restricted to low-skill construction work or the residual tertiary opportunities that have come
in the wake of the subsidised expansion of Tibetan towns, including petty trade and
commerce, and a variety of services, in particular catering. In certain locations, tourism can
be added to this list. Yet these are precisely the areas where Muslim migrants have also
entered into the employment foray in Tibetan towns, taking advantage of their larger regional
trading networks and their more astute business sense. Also, in the case of catering, almost
everyone agrees, Tibetans included, that Muslims make the tastiest food of all. Finally, a
further hurdle relates to the fact that manual employed labour (outside family farming or
herding) and petty trade and commerce are generally stigmatised by Tibetans. The
culmination of all of these factors results in the sidelining of Tibetans from even those
residual low-skill opportunities that have arisen in the new economies of the burgeoning
Tibetan towns of Amdo.
Effectively, these processes are contentious for Tibetans because they challenge the deeply
set notions of hierarchy and dignity that, ironically, had been preserved throughout Maoism
and up until the 1980s. The challenge works across social class, from the level of farmers and
nomads up the level of elites. Tibetan elites are undoubtedly better placed to weather the
displacements within the local economy, particularly the new elite of local government
cadres and others who have positioned themselves as junior partners within Chinese rule.
However, even among such elites, the relative employment security up to the 1980s has
eroded considerably since the 1990s, as mentioned above. Notably, employment strategies for
laid-off staff or workers or for unemployed high school and university graduates are largely
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based on efforts to encourage self-employment in the start-up of small private businesses.85
Yet such strategies imply a downward mobility in the Tibetan conception of local social
hierarchy. They therefore precisely irk the dignity of these once-privileged Tibetan elites as
well as the graduates aspiring for upward-mobility. In particular, the downward mobility aims
at a social level occupied by and competing with the Muslim merchants. Given that these
elites are also keenly aware of the legitimate need for their non-elite rural compatriots to
move up the economic hierarchy in the towns, moving into the economic space that has come
to be dominated by these same Muslims, a powerful common purpose across class has
coalesced within these Tibetan communities, with its target the Muslim businesses.
Enter the boycott
It is within this context that Swadeshi-type discourses of boycott started to emerge among
Amdo Tibetans. The common argument is that, if Tibetans would not spend their money in
Muslim businesses in Tibetan areas (which largely cater to Tibetans), the Muslim businesses
would not be able to survive or profit from Tibetan wealth and the Muslims would leave.
Moral legitimacy is also added to this argument by noting that the departure of Muslims
would also reduce the amount of animal slaughter in the Tibetan areas, given that the
abattoirs are largely run by Muslims, whereas Tibetans only slaughter for their own
subsistence needs.  Conversely, if Tibetans were to set up their own businesses or spend their
money in such businesses, they could capture these areas within the emerging urban
economies of Tibet.
Curiously, while similar arguments have been made with respect to Chinese migrants, the
boycott idea seems to have only taken hold of collective Tibetan inspiration with respect to
Muslims. Even though many so-called ‘spontaneous’ Chinese migrants are also involved in
commerce, catering, or a variety of low-skilled jobs, economic activism has been reserved for
Muslims. While this is in part due to historical antagonism with Muslims and a closer cultural
affinity with the Chinese, it is also due to the variety of contemporary contextual factors
discussed above. In addition, many Chinese migrants are directly or indirectly sustained by
local governments, are often attracted in the first place by relatives in the government, and
they tend to cluster in the more sinicised parts of Tibetan towns. Any activism directed
against them would therefore be treated severely by the local authorities. Due to all of these
factors, Muslims are much more vulnerable to demand-side collective action than Chinese
migrants. Thus, historical animosity is conditioned by these contemporary factors to result in
the fact that Muslims bear the brunt of economic activism, whereas Chinese migrants escape
largely unscathed, if not better off given that they reap much of the clientele lost by the
boycotted Muslim businesses.
While the idea of boycotting Muslim businesses had been around in Amdo since the 1990s,
actual boycotts remained localised events up until 2003, concentrated in a few townships
within certain counties. One Tibetan scholar identified to me three principle townships of
localised boycotts that were active in the late 1990s: two were in Qinghai, one in Chabcha
County and one in Gande County in Golok; and one was in Sichuan, in Ngawa County in
Ngawa (Ch. Aba) Prefecture. It seems that these townships developed as centres of anti-
Muslim activism due to the presence of local leaders. Ngawa County has been especially
important given the leadership of one lama who has been particularly vocal in promoting the
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anti-Muslim boycott cause. The connection to Ngawa is interesting because the county is also
known for a strong tradition of entrepreneurship in trade and is the home of many wealthy
Tibetan businessmen. Given that the Ngawa business community extends strong financial
support to the local Ngawa monasteries, it is likely that this lama advocating the boycott
movement had at least several powerful or wealthy sponsors. Despite the local nature of these
movements, the message of the boycott was well known throughout Amdo, following on the
back of anti-Muslim sentiment that was equally widespread. Even in Central Tibet, far
removed from Amdo, anti-Muslim sentiment was reportedly strong as early as the mid-1990s,
resulting in several clashes, typically involving Muslim restaurants or commercial disputes.86
The clash in Chentsa Town in January 2003 served as a call to action for Tibetans, an
incitement to take matters into their own hands, especially considering the widespread
Tibetan belief that the state-imposed resolution of this episode was biased in favour of the
Muslims.87 Interestingly, it seems that the bravado of Tibetans had also been stoked up by the
events of 9/11, the Afghan war and the lead up to the Iraq war, the latter two of which appear
to have been overwhelmingly supported by Tibetans in Tibet.88 A regional boycott of Muslim
businesses therefore quickly gained momentum soon after the Chentsa clash and even
extended into areas of Kham in Sichuan that had little Muslim presence. Although the
Tibetans in Lhasa that I interviewed were hesitant to talk about it, the boycott had evidently
reached Central Tibet as well, finding an accord with the anti-Muslim sentiment already built
up over the last decade. While the boycott was meant to target all types of Muslim businesses
and trade interactions, including Muslim-owned buses, the main symbolic focus became the
Muslim restaurants that dominate catering throughout Amdo.
The boycott appears to have been strongest, most cohesive and most sustained in the more
remote nomadic areas such as Golok, Yushu and Ngawa, in many cases continuing with force
up until my last field visit in late 2004. In Golok, the boycott took off with an event that
occurred soon after the Chentsa clash, involving the poisoning of three Tibetans in a Muslim
restaurant, one of whom died. The poisoning, which was recorded in the local newspaper,
served as a key local trigger for the boycott, although the question remains whether the
poisoning took place only after the restaurant was heavily harassed by bravado Tibetan
youths, who were no doubt stoked up by the events in Chentsa. Within a year of the
poisoning, the local newspaper reported that the number of Muslim restaurants in the entire
prefecture of Golok had fallen from over 70 to just over 20. Jikdrel Town, which was sacked
by Ma Bufang in the 1930s, was the first town of Golok to entirely rid itself of Muslim
restaurants.89
In the farming regions of Amdo that are closer to Muslim areas in the northwest, such as
Rebgong, Chentsa, Labrang and Chabcha, or even in cities such as Xining and Lanzhou, the
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 Several people interviewed in Lhasa in 2004 told me that in 1994 there were rumours that ‘the Muslims were
coming’ to Lhasa, possibly referring to the liberalisation of inter-provincial migration to the TAR in that year. In
early 1995, one particular incident broke out when some Tibetans claimed to have found a human finger in a
soup served in a Muslim restaurant near the Jokhang Temple. This led Tibetans to claim that the Muslims were
practicing cannibalism. Apparently there were some demonstrations outside the Muslim restaurant. The army
was then quickly called in and Martial Law was declared for several days. I was also told of other conflicts
similar to the commercial tensions in Amdo, such as fights breaking out over prices with Muslim traders. In
recent years, there was also one well publicised case of Muslims trafficking young Tibetan village girls.
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 This perception was expressed to me by many Tibetans from Chentsa and nearby Rebgong during fieldwork
in 2004, along with several Tibetan scholars in Xining.
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 The detonation of the two Buddha statues in Afghanistan in 2001, which was well known to educated Tibetans
in Tibet and India, did not do much to endear the Tibetans to the Taliban either.
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 The events surrounding the poisoning, including the newspaper articles, were recounted to me during a field
visit to Golok in 2004 by a western scholar who had been living there during the time. It seems that some young
Tibetan men in the prefecture capital, many of who are sons of county or prefecture officials and thereby act
with relative impunity, are known to harass and taunt Muslim restaurant owners. In any case, most local police
are also Tibetan.
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boycott did start with a bang but soon petered out within less than a year. In many cases the
advent of the boycott was enforced with some degree of moralistic coercion by Tibetan
activists, many of them monks. For instance, Tibetans found eating in Muslim restaurants
were shamed or even beaten up afterwards on the street. In Rongwo Town, the seat of
Rebgong County, it was reported that activists, in particular monks from the nearby Rongwo
Monastery, would impose fines on Tibetans for eating in Muslim restaurants. In this way,
Tibetans who were opposed to the boycott were silenced or at least quietened, thereby
imposing an appearance of consensus, which is highly valued in Tibetan communities.
The boycott gradually ran out of steam in these more central areas due to the difficulties of
boycotting neighbours in towns that have had a long history of ethnic coexistence and where
Muslims play an important symbiotic role in the local economy. The popularity of Muslim
food together with the poor quality of Tibetan catering alternatives played important roles as
well. Even in Golok, many of the Muslim restaurants were simply taken over by Chinese
migrants from Sichuan, who often display their colours by advertising their new
establishments as ‘pork restaurants’. While very popular as tasty alternatives to Muslim food,
the displacement of Muslim by Chinese restaurateurs has in part defeated the more
instrumental purpose of the boycott movement, which was to allow local Tibetans the chance
to enter into these areas of the urban service economy that had been hitherto dominated by
Muslims.
The tale of the Muslim cook and other modern racist mythologies
Parallel to the rapid spread of the boycott, a racist mythology emerged among Tibetans
throughout Amdo. The most typical among these myths is what I have come to call ‘The Tale
of the Muslim Cook’. Its appearance in the collective consciousness of Amdo Tibetans, along
with similar non-culinary spin-offs, seems to have taken place more or less around the time of
the clash at Chentsa. In any case, whatever the origins of the tale, whenever it was told to me
the time reference was always recent, i.e. within the last year or two.
A typical version of the tale, told in all seriousness by the average Tibetan, including
relatively educated Tibetans such as high school students, follows a standard formula,
although elements vary from locality to locality. Here or there, a Muslim cook prepared the
food they served to Tibetans using their left-over dirty bath water. Or, they used the bath
water of an imam. Or, in the most extreme accounts, they put the ashes of the cremated bones
of an imam or even their parents in the cooking water, according to an alleged Muslim belief
that this will cause the eater to convert to Islam, or at the very least, make them sympathise
with Islam.90 An almost identical event apparently took place in many counties. Some tellers
sourced the exact event to Ngawa County, others to the neighbouring county, and yet others
to their own county. According to one rendition of the story (that apparently happened in
several different counties if all renditions are to be believed), a Muslim cook was working for
a Tibetan boss and business was very good. One day the Muslim decided to leave, after
which business worsened because the food was not as good. The Tibetan boss phoned the
Muslim cook and requested him to come back, at which point the cook told the boss that he
would never come back and that all the while he had been cooking with his used bath water.
It is told that this is how this Muslim practice of disrespect was exposed. I was told by several
Tibetans in Rongwo that this event actually took place within the Rongwo Monastery itself,
although this was denied by one lama of the monastery.
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 I asked one Hui Muslim secondary school teacher about this in Rebgong and he insisted that there was no such
belief among local Muslims. On reading Lipman (1997), p.69, I have come to wonder whether this belief among
Tibetans is in part a misconstrued interpretation of certain mystical esoteric Sufi practices such as sand blowing.
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In the non-culinary spin-offs, the medium of cooking is not even necessary. For instance, in
Yushu it is said that passing Muslim motorists throw the ashes of cremated imams in the air,
which then lands on or is inhaled by hapless Tibetan pedestrians and has the same effect as
eating a tasty noodle soup. It does not seem to perturb these story tellers that Muslims in fact
do not cremate the bodies of their dead, but bury them according to prescriptions given by the
Koran. Indeed, Rebgong County itself has been the scene of several well known conflicts
over Muslim attempts to rent or buy land for the purpose of establishing cemeteries, in which
case it should be obvious that even local Muslims bury their dead. However, this lack of
corroboration does not seem to perturb ongoing embellishments of the ashy versions of the
myth.
Origins of the myths
Racist conceptions of Muslims are not new to Tibetans. For instance, when Muslim migration
from the northwest to Lhasa started to increase in the mid-1990s, racist rumours apparently
abounded in Lhasa. Muslim bread was yellow because they urinated in it, or they put their
scabs in their food, or else, as mentioned previously, they practiced cannibalism and ate
children.91 Similarly, Lipman notes that in the Gansu region, the Xunhua Salar and the
Hezhou Chinese Muslims were portrayed by non-Muslim locals, including Tibetans, as a
ferocious lot as far back as the seventeenth century and Gansu mothers would discipline their
children with the threat of the Hezhou Muslim boogieman.92 Certainly, as noted by many
scholars of Chinese Muslims, the prejudice that Chinese Muslims are naturally violent and
driven by jihadist impulses has been well ingrained among both Chinese and Tibetans for
centuries. Such attitudes are still very present among Tibetans today. 
However, what is striking in the recent events has been the tight synchronicity between the
boycott movement and the culinary racist myths, along with the rapid dissemination of both
throughout most of Amdo and other parts of Tibet within a matter of months. The most
coherent explanation that I have managed to assemble from my discussions with a variety
people in Qinghai, including local and foreign scholars, Tibetan and Chinese officials, lamas,
and Tibetan journalists, teachers and students, is that The Muslim Cook myth was initiated by
certain Tibetan elites. These elites would have principally included certain secular
intellectuals from some of the main urban centres in and around Amdo, such as Chabcha,
Rebgong, Xining and Lanzhou, along with certain lamas and religious intellectuals, such as
the Ngawa lama mentioned above. The dissemination of the myth subsequently took place
through students, businesspeople or others who travel regularly between these key urban
centres and the dispersed villages and towns of Amdo and beyond.93
These elite actors can be broadly considered as part of a Tibetan intellectual community that
circulates within both secular and religious Tibetan institutions in Amdo. The secular include
the minority universities, research or cultural institutes, Tibetan newspapers, and other
organisations, all of which have functioned under the auspices of the PRC since the 1980s as
part of the policy of promoting nominal ‘minority autonomy’. Many of these secular actors
maintain a tight interaction with the religious elites; because one of the main foci of secular
minority education is the study of culture and language, the secular scholars often seek out
close formal or informal collaboration with monastic scholars given that the monasteries play
a key role in maintaining high standards of literacy and scholarship in classical Tibetan and
Buddhism. Interaction is further supported by the fact that close family, kinship or other
social ties often bind the secular and religious intellectual communities. In turn, the same
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 Notably, the clash in Chentsa occurred just before both the Tibetan and Chinese New Years, when many
Tibetans residing in towns and cities return to their home villages.
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social ties also bind both communities to broader elite networks, principally Tibetan cadres
and businesspeople, who in turn act to various degrees within the limited space sanctioned by
the state to support the projects of either the secular or the religious intellectuals.94
From the religious side, it has already been noted that many members of the religious
community have been actively involved in boycott activism, from lamas playing key roles in
defining the normative dimensions of the boycott down to heavy-handed monks enforcing the
boycott through either their moral or muscular authority. In particular, the leadership of lamas
has been tacitly acknowledged by even state authorities, highlighted by the fact that several
key meetings with religious leaders were reportedly convened by the Qinghai government in
efforts to diffuse the boycott. In one meeting in Golok that was reported to me, most of the
leading lamas from the prefecture were assembled in the prefecture capital and officials
requested them to tell the Golok Tibetans to eat in Muslim restaurants in the name of
preserving interethnic harmony. It was said that one of the most senior lamas present at the
meeting replied to the officials with the observation that Chinese and Muslim people never
eat in Tibetan restaurants. He therefore concluded that they would tell their people to eat in
Muslim restaurants only if the Chinese authorities would tell Chinese and Muslim people to
eat in Tibetan restaurants.
According to the explanation that I have assembled, many of these elites had been brewing
the boycott idea for a while. Following the events at Chentsa, as well as the general level of
excitement that was surrounding the events in Iraq in early 2003, some of these elites took
advantage of the general feelings of frustration and agitation to disseminate The Muslim
Cook myth in various versions, playing off local events. According to several particularly
frank Tibetan scholars and several western scholars, the myth was created and disseminated
as a means to incite Tibetans to embark on a regional movement.95 In other words, events
such as Chentsa were capable of mobilising rural Tibetans into collective acts of retribution
in manners typical of Tibetan feuding,96 but these were not effective in moving most of them
beyond revenge and into more far reaching strategies. This required that Tibetans become
motivated to attack and take over the economic foundations of the Muslim advance into their
local economies. However, a direct and logically analytical discourse, à la Swadeshi, has so
far proved ineffective to mobilise on a large scale the largely uneducated rural population.
The myths therefore served this purpose by motivating Tibetans to view Muslim businesses
in an antagonistic manner and to avoid them, thereby providing the breathing space for
Tibetan businesses to enter the service and trade foray and to capture some of the urban
economic space from Muslim businesses. Essentially, the myths were a means justified by an
end; awareness was raised among Tibetans that, even under the yoke of Chinese rule, they
have the power to affect their progressively marginalised position by using their collectively
manoeuvred consumer power.
According to this understanding, the concoction of the myths suggests a classic case of
instrumentalism, i.e. elites fomenting ethnic conflict in order to advance their own strategic
agendas; or expressed in more subtle terms, grievances operating through structures of
entitlements such that they result in open conflict.97 However, the myths are equally
primordialist; locations of previous conflict with Ma Bufang in the 1930s, such as in Golok,
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experienced some of the strongest and most sustained boycotts, and more generally, the
rhetoric behind the boycott draws from a deep historical sense of religious competition with
Muslims. Indeed, the roots of current conflicts are believed by many Tibetans to have been
prophesised more than a thousand years earlier in the Kalachakra Tantra commentaries, and
many of the historical examples that educated Tibetans drawn upon to make their case refer
to informed examples of competition between Islam and Buddhism, such as the loss of
Buddhist centres in Afghanistan, Iran, Kashmir, Khotan, and even Sumatra, to Islam.
Furthermore, on closer examination the direct benefits of the boycott to the Tibetan elite are
not clear. Some Tibetan businesspeople might have possibly benefited from the takeover of
urban economic space, and, as mentioned previously, it is interesting that one of the main
sources of the boycott movement, Ngawa County in Sichuan, is also known for its very
successful business community. Nonetheless, businesspeople do not appear to have been the
primary instigators of the boycott movement, although they probably helped in its financing
or circulation, as they would have done for any other nationalist or religious movement.
Members of the secular and religious educated elite, on the other hand, seem to have played
primary leadership roles, yet their personal benefit is also not clear. Most secular intellectuals
are rooted in state or para-state sector employment that is generally not threatened by
Muslims, yet which could be threatened if their activities would be deemed contrary to state
interests, as in the case of fomenting of nationalism or ethnic conflict. Similarly, the new
policies concerning the employment of high school and university graduates have intensified
competition with Chinese rather than Muslim graduates. Lamas and the religious elite from
their own side are also more or less immune to economic competition from Muslims and,
similar to the secular elites, becoming identified with politically sensitive activities would
only serve to further strain the already tenuous relations between the religious institutions and
the state. From the cost-benefit, self-interested rational choice side of the equation, all signs
point to the Han Chinese as the main contenders of elite rivalry, besides the fact of course
that the Han Chinese are also overwhelmingly dominant in almost all aspects of the polity
and economy.
Effectively, an instrumental interpretation only takes us to a partial understanding of these
events, particularly with respect to the backlash against Muslims. This is because a strong
normative concern for the general situation of their group, defined in terms of Tibeto-
Buddhist solidarity, exists within the instrumental strategies of the elite. In this case, ethnic
animosity does not necessarily follow a purely economistic or entitlement rational, although
certain economic/entitlement aspects of a larger malaise become the symbolic rallying points.
Yet these rallying points are those that most closely touch the nerve of dignity, rooted in
conceptions of hierarchy and culture, and that are further conditioned by a sense of
expediency. Along these lines, Muslims receive the brunt of Tibetan animosity because, on
one hand, they are upwardly mobile in the economic hierarchy from a lower and stigmatised
positions, and on the other hand, they are not necessarily mobile in the social or political
hierarchy, at least not within the Tibetan areas, given that both Tibetans and Chinese share
similar prejudices against Muslims. The former touches a symbolic sensitivity with regard to
the exclusionary dynamics faced by both common and elite Tibetans within their local
economies, while the latter makes it expedient for Tibetans to scapegoat the Muslims. On this
contemporary basis, it becomes easy for Tibetans to construct a historiography of conflict
with Muslims that draws on potent religious symbols precisely because of the primordialist
nature of Tibetan-Muslim co-existence.
In this sense, it is interesting to note that even among Tibetan religious leaders who were
opposed to or abstained from the boycott, many nonetheless share a certain degree of
consensus with other Tibetan elites on the need for Tibetans to take a more competitive
stance towards Muslims. For instance, in the case of two extensive interviews that I carried
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out with two lamas from different parts of Amdo, both of whom did not overtly support the
boycott and could be considered moderates in their communities,98 both implicitly supported
the larger principles underlying the boycott. They explained their positions through a subtle
and skilful circular reasoning that mixed Buddhist reasoning with informed interpretations of
history as well as rhetorical stereotypes that bordered on racism. In particular, both lamas
portrayed the competition between Tibetans and Muslims in terms of a fundamental
antagonism that has existed between Buddhism and Islam throughout history and one which
placed Tibetans on the defensive. Both focused on differences of orthopraxy to justify their
cautiously racist characterisations of Muslims as naturally violent, tricky and cheating,
thereby explaining the reasons for Muslim success in the Tibetan economy as well as the
reasons for Tibetan insecurity.
Thus despite their opposition to the boycott in its overt aggressive form, both lamas ended by
giving very similar justifications for the boycott. These ultimately returned to the economic
issues that have been contemporary to the reform period of the last 25 years – the idea that
Muslims are slowly taking over the economy in the Tibetan areas. Both thought that the
boycott could, in the end, have a positive outcome by stimulating Tibetans to start thinking
about these issues, such as developing businesses and moving into new areas of the economy.
 Nonetheless, despite the apparent Buddhist principles of non-violence, Amdo Tibetans have
not hesitated in the past to rise up in armed resistance against both invading Muslim and
Chinese armies, and in these previous instances the religious leadership played central
mobilising roles. This martial memory and pride is still very much alive in Amdo, with older
generations having experienced periods of resistance against both Ma Bufang in the 1930s
and the PLA in the 1950s. In effect, the advice to resist Muslim economic dominance can be
easily misconstrued, if indeed it was not a covert signal to take a heavy handed stance
towards Muslims. Such covert messages would be a necessity under current Chinese
dominance, given that any open call to conflict would bring immediate retribution from the
state, as it did in the case of events in Chentsa.
Conclusion
Superficially, these trends appear to follow a rough historical pattern of animosity towards
Muslims, which in turn suggests a primordialist pattern of conflict. However, this observation
is not very interesting in itself, besides the fact that it refutes a purely instrumentalist or
constructivist interpretation of conflict. Because Tibetans and Muslims have been coexisting
for most of the millennium, during which time China, in its various manifestations, has held a
regional dominance, most relationships, whether conflictive or cooperative, are infused with
primordialism, even those that are instrumented or constructed. Conversely, primordialism in
the present is also usually the ghost of instrumentalism or constructivism in the past, in the
negotiation and renegotiation of all of these relations.
Furthermore, the explanation of primordialism does not explain why a conflictive primordial
pattern supersedes a cooperative primordial pattern. Prior to the twentieth century, Tibetans
and Muslims had a long history of coexistence that was generally symbiotic and cooperative
in nature, religious disdain aside. On the other hand, the violence directed towards Tibetans
during the period of radical Maoism from the 1950s to the 1970s was largely perpetrated by
Chinese and far exceeded earlier localised episodes of Muslim aggression in the first half of
the twentieth century, which were experienced mostly in Amdo. Even today, Chinese
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migrants in the Tibetan areas represent a more exclusionary force in the local economy than
Muslims. Why then are the Chinese gradually redeemed within a generation of the worst
episode of interethnic violence ever experienced by Tibetans, while the Muslims are
gradually ostracised for much less? Again, is this primordialism at work or something else?
A processual analysis of social exclusion and social protection helps to break out of this
circular reasoning. The Tibetan-Muslim scenario is particularly notable for shifts in local
ethnic power hierarchies that have largely taken place in the twentieth century. Obviously,
the most fundamental of these was the creation of the PRC in 1949 and its achievement of
complete dominance in the direct rule of all the Tibetan areas in the 1950s. Direct rule by
China has since been implicitly understood by all to imply the hegemony of Han Chinese
ethnicity, despite the claims of official rhetoric. Population and structural economic
transformations also underlie this colossal reconfiguration of state power, most significant of
which have been population and urban growth, together with the relative decline of
agriculture and the relative rise of trade, industry and services in the economy, all of which
have unbalanced the niche specialisations between Tibetans and Muslims and undermined the
traditional economic dominance of Tibetans in the Tibetan areas. Together, these shifts have
intensified competitive posturing between Tibetans and Muslims under the shadow of a
sudden leap in Chinese supremacy.
In this context, the impulse for social protection comes into play. On one hand, Tibetans act
to prevent long term economic exclusion by attempting to capture old or new Muslim niches
in the newly emerging urban economies of the Tibetan areas, or else to negotiate better terms
of trade in the rural economies. These instrumental strategic considerations thereby lay the
basis for much of the recent Tibetan-Muslim conflict, even while such conflicts are
legitimated on the basis of a religiously-inspired historiography of conflict with Muslims that
refers back 1300 years. Such competitive conflict is grudgingly tolerated by the state, so long
as it does not break out into open violence, because it is directed towards another non-
hegemonic minority group that is also stigmatised by the Chinese. While the instrumental
concerns of the strategies of social protection are rooted in political economy, they are more
importantly rooted in a sense of cultural and social dignity that is inherited from an
indigenous conception of local hierarchy and power. In other words, the political and
economic cannot be extracted from the cultural and social, just as the instrumental cannot be
extracted from the primordial.
In this sense, while Tibetan-Muslim co-existence and conflict has gone through many phases
over the centuries, a critical difference distinguishes the current phase, dating from the
beginning of the reforms, from all earlier phases. Due to a variety of factors, Muslims have
been quicker to urbanise and they have also been quicker and more successful to move into
industry during the reform period, even if industry had not necessarily been part of their
traditional niche specialisations in the Tibetan areas. In contrast, Tibetans have remained
entrenched in agriculture, despite attempts by local governments to enter wool-processing
industries over the same period. Although agriculture was once a source or status and wealth,
the sharply declining terms of trade for agricultural goods since the 1950s have eroded this
relative position, which in turn has privileged those in trade and manufacturing. Policies of
national and international integration accelerated these trends in the 1980s and 1990s,
exemplified by the dramatic collapse in wool prices. The specialisation of Tibetans in wool
production and of Muslims in wool trading or processing has therefore had a dramatic impact
on the terms of trade between these two groups, reinforcing the rise of Muslims in trade and
commerce in the Tibetan areas, while eroding the relative wealth of Tibetans. These
polarising dynamics can be seen to provide critical ripening conditions for the re-emergence
of older ethnic rivalries between these two groups.
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Notably, all of these relative changes break down the whole logic that an imagined
harmonious equilibrium of inter-ethnic relations in China is rooted in these ethnic niche
specialisations, which is the position taken by many Chinese scholars and the government.
On the contrary, conflictive posturing of Tibetans towards Muslims is exacerbated on the
basis of winning and losing niches, old and new, and overt boycott movements and racist
discourses have been innovated as means to mobilise Tibetans into preventing the erosion of
their economic power and capturing new areas of economic space. These tendencies lead, in
some cases, to overt violence between Tibetans and Muslims, motivated by this competitive
posturing. While the confrontations are rooted in historical cleavages, modern conditions
have added critical ingredients to maintain the coalescence of conflict across political and
social lines.
Within all of these perspectives, interethnic relations can be seen to be shaped and
conditioned by defensive responses to exclusion on one hand and ‘contested inclusion’ on the
other,99 as various groups seek to defend, negotiate, leverage or innovate existing or new
modes of integration into the changing matrices of power within a transforming setting, in
cultural, social, political and economic spheres. These responses are driven by the impulse for
social protection, which in turn is shaped by the perceived paths for seeking social protection,
framed within the context of discursive and moral notions of dignity and decency. In this
sense, the evolution of a more conflictive posturing of one group towards another is critically
influenced by their relative position with respect to the other and with respect to possibilities
for social protection.
The resultant strategies of social protection may be conceived on historically-rooted identities
or else on constructed or ‘imagined’ identities in the modern period. Similarly, motivations
may be political and economic, or else they may be morally-based, drawing off ideas of
redemption, generosity, retribution, preservation of religion or the advocacy of any particular
ideology. In any particular ethnic relation, any or all of these various influences may be
interacting. However, the plurality of sources and motivations is not the main point; rather,
the commonality that bonds them all together, that fuels them all, that identifies them as
modern conflicts, representative of a broad modern systemic trend, are the underlying forces
of dislocation and relocation that are fundamental to modern transformations and capitalism,
which shape the patterns of exclusion and avenues for social protection..
Conflictive evolutions must therefore be understood in terms of the continuity of historical
fissures within the dislocating transformations wrought by modernity. Dislocation becomes
exacerbated in poor peripheral areas or under the disempowering conditions of conquest or
forced and subordinated integration into larger political, economic or cultural spheres. These
conditioning factors leave communities with less capacity to absorb and adapt to dislocation
and thus more vulnerable to associated exclusionary dynamics. This understanding is
important because it draws attention towards the responsibility of the larger macro-
environment – whether national or international – for the prevention of potential conflict. The
role of developmental processes, the impact of economic models and policies, or the manner
of integrating peripheral regions into larger entities all act as critical conditions that can throw
a symbiotic relationship into a violent one, by exacerbating the basis for conflictive elements
to emerge and become the mobilising point for defensive reactions.
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In this paper, the term ‘Chinese Muslims’ refers to an amalgamation of a broad range of
Muslim groups across China, although generally it is not used to refer to the Uighurs in
Xinjiang given their distinct Turkic identity and language. By and large the Chinese Muslims
are Chinese-speaking, having adopted the Chinese language sometime during the Ming
dynasty (1368-1644) and intermixed with Chinese people even before that time. The largest
group is the Hui, although the Hui itself is also an amalgamation of a diverse range of groups,
leading many scholars to question the relevance of considering the Hui as a single ethnic
group. An important concentration of Chinese Muslims is based in the historical Gansu
Province, which included the present-day jurisdictions of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous
Region, modern Gansu Province and the northeast corner of Qinghai (Huangzhong), the latter
two bordering Northeast Tibet (Amdo). In this region the ‘Chinese Muslims’ are particularly
diverse, including non-Chinese speaking groups such as the Turkic-speaking Salar, the
Mongolic-speaking Dongxiang, and Tibetan-speaking Muslims (i.e. small groups in Central
Tibet and Qinghai who were classified as Hui in the 1950s). For an excellent history of
Muslims in Northwest China, see Jonathon N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A history of
Muslims in Northwest China. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997. With respect to
Chinese Muslims in China more generally, two other well known western sources include
Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991; and; Michael Dillon, China’s Muslim Hui Community:
Migration, Settlement and Sects. Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999.
Tibet
In this paper, ‘Tibet’ refers to all of the Tibetan areas in China, including the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan areas that have been incorporated into the
provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. This use of the term ‘Tibet’ conforms to
administrative definitions of Tibetan autonomous areas in China and it also conforms to
indigenous self-definition, that is, the people who call themselves Bodpa (Tibetan) refer to
the regions that they have traditionally inhabited as Bod (Tibet), broadly divided into Utsang
(Central Tibet), Kham (Eastern Tibet), Amdo (North-eastern Tibet) and Ngari and Changtang
(Western Tibet). Notably, more than half of these Tibetan areas are located outside the TAR.
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